Palantir Technologies: Nicked by Sharp Marketing and Metaphors
March 24, 2026
Another dinobaby post. No AI unless it is an image. This dinobaby is not Grandma Moses, just Grandpa Arnold.
I learned about an article by reading a March 13, 2026 report titled “It Beggars Belief: MoD Sources Warn Palantir’s Role at Heart of Government Is Threat to UK’s Security.” The write up says:
Palantir, the US AI surveillance and security firm with hundreds of millions of pounds in UK government contracts, poses “a national security threat to the UK”, according to two anonymous high-level sources working with the Ministry of Defence.
My problem is that the sources are anonymous. The UK has struggled with certain types of software. One example comes to mind: The British Post Office. Another is the National Health Services’ arm wrestling with software. Plus, I am not familiar with the online publication The Nerve.
Thanks, Venice.ai. Good enough.
One of the anonymous sources in The Nerve’s write up allegedly said:
“Allowing a single entity, foreign or domestic, to have such far-reaching, pervasive access is inherently dangerous. How our national cybersecurity center has allowed this beggars belief.”
Jim Killock, executive director of the Open Rights Group, allegedly told The Nerve:
“If the US has detailed insights across everything that the MoD does, then in the event of us being recalcitrant about helping the US bomb some country, they can remind us – subtly or unsubtly – what they might do in retaliation. “The Ministry of Defence or the prime minister must have some inkling of the risks, but now we find ourselves hitched to an erratic, dangerous, megalomaniac power in denial of its own limits. If Palantir knows everything, it just gives them huge extra leverage.”
What’s interesting is that a personage using the alias sschueller provided a pointer to a February x, 2026, article in the Swiss online publication Republik. Its article “How Tenaciously Palantir Courted Switzerland” provided some additional color about Palantir Technologies.
Here’s are some quotes from the Republik write up. Are they accurate? I have no idea. I find them interesting, however.
“Palantir is here to disrupt. (…) and, when it’s necessary, to scare our enemies and occasionally kill them.”
and
“The rise of the West has not been made possible by the superiority of its ideas, values, or religion, but rather by its superiority in the use of organized violence.”
and
CTO Shyam Sankar said that Palantir products help “optimize the kill chain.”
I find Palantir somewhat amusing. The company named itself after a seeing stone, a fictional creation in the fantasy novel, The Lord of the Rings by J..R.R. Tolkien. The palentiri are not likely to save whales and snail darters.
Several observations seem to be warranted:
- Palantir’s PR is either doing its job or it is failing in its effort to present the firm in a positive manner
- Specialized software companies may find their marketing methods turn off certain commercial and government customers
- The company seems to engender fear, not just concern. (Is that a reason why most specialized software companies walk softly and market without becoming poster kids like NSO Group for questionable practices.)
Net net: My view is that some US technology companies are feeding negative perceptions about American business, technologies, and trustworthiness. But I am a dinobaby in rural Kentucky. What do I know about American firms selling to non-US entities? Nothing. Absolutely nothing. Why worry?
Stephen E Arnold, March 24, 2026
Has Paragon Knocked NSO Group Off the Leader Board for Great Marketing?
March 2, 2026
Another dinobaby post. No AI unless it is an image. This dinobaby is not Grandma Moses, just Grandpa Arnold.
NSO Group has been a good example of what happens when PR and marketing is viewed as no big deal. These two soft functions are definitely significant in certain contexts; for example, public awareness of mobile security.
I am not sure if the information in “The Israeli Spyware Firm That Accidentally Just Exposed Itself” is 100 percent accurate. I have not seen many references to this article published on February 12, 2026. I am writing this short blog post on February 23, 2026. It is possible that the write up simply is not that significant in the midst of some kinetic outfits near Iran and the constant refrains of Epstein Epstein Epstein.
Thanks, Venice.ai. Good enough.
What does the write up say as actual factual.
Here’s the main point of the story from Ahmedeldin’s report:
Israeli surveillance company Paragon Solutions briefly exposed its own spyware dashboard on LinkedIn, revealing the hidden architecture of a billion-dollar surveillance empire built on the backs of journalists, activists, and ordinary people.
Yep, good old LinkedIn. I am not 100 percent certain why spyware, intelware, and policeware vendors [a] have a LinkedIn page or [b] why those working as contractors or employees at these *ware firm allow individuals to put any information on any social media about what is secretive products for specialized applications. The fact that LinkedIn was a conduit strikes me as a big time mistake in governance. I personally have not felt comfortable with *ware outfits pitching their “products” after egregious security breaches have taken place when these types of systems were up and running. The problems range from commercial nightmares like SolarWind to nation state issues like the October attack on festival goers in Israel. Yep, governance is more important than marketing or over confidence.
Here’s a secondary point in the write up:
Once spyware achieves device-level persistence, access pathways inevitably extend beyond the narrow confines vendors claim and describe. The technical reality is clear: if you can compromise a device, you can access everything…. The $900 million valuation of Paragon Solutions reveals the brutal economics of surveillance capitalism.
The article wants to make darned sure the reader knows that governments cannot be trusted with sophisticated *ware. In the context of certain nation states going all in for smart software from third parties, the idea is planted that bad things will happen. News flash: Bad things have already happened and regulators and law makers have not been able to do much about these “leaky” systems.
What’s the fix? What’s the reader supposed to do?
Here’s the conclusion to the write up:
This is a crisis of global proportion, a threat to human dignity that crosses borders and transcends politics. The question is no longer whether we should be concerned about surveillance. The question is whether we will allow this system to continue unchecked, whether we will demand accountability from those who profit from our vulnerability, whether we will reclaim our digital lives from those who would turn our devices into tools of control.
Where’s the fix? Where’s the citizen pressure on elected officials? Where’s the external repair person for the damaged moral compasses in the leadership of certain big tech companies?
I hear crickets.
Stephen E Arnold, March 2, 2026
Palantir: Morphing into an SAP-Type Outfit: Intelware Is a Minor Component
February 23, 2026
Another dinobaby post. No AI unless it is an image. This dinobaby is not Grandma Moses, just Grandpa Arnold.
Palantir Technologies has been around a couple of decades. I wrote about the firm’s system in my book “CyberOSINT: Next Generation Information Access.” Like the other intelware vendors’ systems, Palantir used open source, home brew code, an interface twist (see illustration from one of the older versions), and moxie. Palantir used “forward deployed engineers” who would go to a prospect’s office, set up a system, and show the staff how to use the system. At the time, most of the Palantir bells and whistles were already in systems developed originally by i2 Ltd. I was a consultant to i2 Ltd, and my legal eagles told me long ago I should make that point.
A senior forward deployed engineer explains that the Palantir system is indeed a “seeing stone.” It can provide its licensees with unparalleled insight. Those in such presentations often believe that Palantir has the same magic that infuses “The Lord of the Rings.” Thanks, Qwen. Close enough.
In terms of the longevity of intelware companies, Palantir has kept on trucking. Many of the companies I profiled in CyberOSINT in 2015 have been acquired, merged, or folded up their tent and focused on selling ad agencies. The core functions of these systems included at that time:
- User point-and-click interfaces
- Some control over data added to a system by the user
- Relationship diagrams
- Easier cross tabulations
- Report generation tools.
In the intervening decade, the current crop of intelware systems have bolted on smart software. These functions are useful because the volume of data for an investigation or an analysis for intelligence purposes involves a lot of data.
What’s going on with Palantir Technologies now? The main developments are:
- Big visibility. Most people cannot name an intelware company, but quite a few know about Palantir or have some name recognition. Palantir has won the PR battle. Too bad Light House and Sixgill.
- Big contracts. Palantir is not in the $5,000 a month range. The size of the publicized contracts are big.
- Big capabilities. Palantir makes clear in its marketing that it has the biggest, best intelware system anywhere. (I am not sure I agree with that, but that’s not germane to this post.)
Why am I writing about Palantir on February 20, 2026? Answer: I read “DHS Awards Palantir up to $1B to Deploy AI and Data Analytics Platforms.” The number is big or seems big. There is that “up to” caveat. The article states:
The U.S. Department of Homeland Security has awarded Palantir Technologies Inc. a five-year blanket purchase to expand the department’s use of artificial intelligence and large-scale data analytics platforms across its agencies.
From my point of view, the most important factoid in the news story is this one:
The agreement, which is valued at up to $1 billion, allows multiple DHS agencies to acquire Palantir platforms without initiating separate competitive contracts for each deployment. The blanket purchasing agreement deal establishes pre-approved pricing and terms, with funding distributed through individual task orders over the five-year period rather than as a single upfront award.
As I interpret the passage, it seems that other intelware vendors may have a more difficult time selling or licensing their systems to DHS. Some of those systems are better than Palantir’s system, but that’s normal in the world of intelware. No one system does everything. Larger systems exhibit innovation friction. The bigger the outfit, the more difficult it becomes to integrate in a slick way the latest and greatest twist for law enforcement and intelligence professionals conducting investigations. That’s why larger intelware outfits acquire small, more fleet of foot start ups.
This is a screenshot of the right click wheel selector. The idea is that this right click method is more functional for an investigator. I believe the interface has been updated since I snagged this in 2006 or 2007 in a demo at a trade show. I assume the entire image is copyright protected, trademarked, and super proprietary. Anyway, it is definitely a Palantir “innovation.”
Several observations:
- The contract suggests that standardization makes it easier to train authorized users of a system like Palantir’s
- Personnel can move more easily from one unit of DHS to another without having to deal with different intelware products. (Some will find their way into specialized units anyway.)
- DHS has, in theory, one throat to choke if the system or the customized instances of Palantir’s software does not meet the specification for that implementation.
I won’t mention names, but there was a similar “let’s just pick one and go” approach a number of years ago. The company promised a range of specific capabilities, asserted flexibility, and described easier customization than other approaches. What happened? In this particular intelware instance, the multi year agree was on the rocks within nine months. The time required to train and develop the custom applications for the use cases converted intelware into a more inefficient deployment than SAP or similar “workflow” system. The costs of implementation soared as engineering change orders and supplemental specifications were developed and pushed forward. In a short time, money ran out and these fixes had to be integrated into the next fiscal year’s budget.
I did not work on this particular project. I was engaged in an equally large and even more visible project related to government-wide search and retrieval of digital information. I didn’t think about one agency. We were struggling with the entire airport van of agencies, departments, and related entities.
Nevertheless, we learned about the issues that a Swiss army knife poses when one or more of the tools doesn’t open or breaks upon use. I hope that the Palantir solution does not create a similar set of issues for DHS. I want to be optimistic. I know that descriptions like this are very appealing to government executives, and I quote from the news story:
DHS is expected to use Palantir’s platforms to support investigative case management, threat identification, logistics coordination and operational planning. The platforms apply machine learning models and rules-based analytics to information from enforcement databases, biometric systems, financial records, travel data and other sources to generate risk assessments, link analyses and operational dashboards.
Palantir’s system, if this paragraph is accurate, is no longer intelware. It is smart software doing what SAP-type systems do. Believe me, intelware is a tough enough niche. Expecting Palantir to be enterprise integration and automation software looks like an even more complex undertaking.
Can Palantir deliver? Sure, anything can be done with money, time, and appropriate knowledge resources (people, folks). The problem is that in DHS and other enforcement-type entities time is a problem. Changing priorities is a constant. Pressure is high and unrelenting. Small intelware vendors are, as I said, speedy. Big outfits aren’t.
Just a thought. (Oh, the CyberOSINT book is still available for free for law enforcement and intelligence professionals. Just write us at kentmaxwell at proton dot me.)
Stephen E Arnold, February 23, 2026
Palantir Technologies: What Is with Kim Dotcom?
February 16, 2026
Another dinobaby post. No AI unless it is an image. This dinobaby is not Grandma Moses, just Grandpa Arnold.
I walk the dog and I check out some newsfeeds. The Pinboard.in service provided a snip that said “Palantir was allegedly hacked.” The linked showed me a segment of a Kim Dotcom tweet. When I returned to my office with a happy dog, I clicked the linked again. Nope. Not valid. I poked around on X.com and my Russian language feed. X.com said, “Something has gone wrong.” Okay, no surprise.
I have zero clue if the story is true. If it is, it strikes me that some government cyber professionals will verify the validity or the inaccuracy of Kim Dotcom’s post. Here is the original, which I tracked down using some of my old-fashioned, dinobaby methods:
The original tweet asserts as actual factual:
Peter Thiel and Alex Karp commit mass surveillance of world leaders and titans of industry on a massive scale.
In my experience, I am not sure this lines up 100 percent with what Palantir actually does do. But Kim Dotcom doesn’t call me to learn about the right click wheel, the tie up with Microsoft, or the firm’s Wall Street Journal ads which said the company was an artificial intelligence outfit. Firms in the intelware business have a bit of a dual personality: There is the software and what it can do right now with a particular data set. Then there is the software presented in a demo in a trade show booth. Sometimes the two worlds are slightly different.
Mr. Dotcom asserts as the shining truth these factoids:
Palantir is creating nuclear and bio weapon capabilities for Ukraine and is working closely with the CIA to defeat Russia. They [sic] believe they [sic] are one year away. They [sic] plan to achieve this by keeping Russia busy with meaningless peace negotiations.
There you go. A curious mind might ask, “Who is keeping whom busy?”
I found this statement intriguing:
Palantir is an arm of the CIA and all data from international is copied into a CIA spy cloud.
I ran a few queries on the Web search systems’ “news” sites. I checked one of my favorite Russian sources PCnews.ru and the Yandex.com system. I did not poke around on Telegram. I don’t have my “Telegram only” device with me, but I will check this evening when I leave my cave like office in rural Kentucky.
One Russian link resolved, and I was able to read courtesy of a free online translation system this article: “Dotcom Reported Hacking of the Software Developer for the CIA Palantir. ” That write up said:
“According to reports, Palantir has been subjected to a hacker attack. Artificial intelligence was used to gain access with superuser rights,” he wrote on his page on the social network X (ex. Twitter).
Palantir is an AI company, the WSJ ad told me this. How could one AI fool another AI? I assume exactly the same way malware centric Chrome extensions make life interesting for users of Google Chrome, a product of the Mandiant and Deepseek technologies. Stuff happens.
Several observations are warranted in my opinion:
- Either Kim Dotcom has been hacked and an entity is using him as a convenient vector for fakery or Kim Dotcom is telling the truth and adding some fighter jet illumination to the back of his T shirt
- The link problem raises some interesting thoughts as well. How can Pinboard.in users react so quickly to a post and then take down that post. Pinboard.in is a stable service, but it is definitely not spoof proof. I routinely report porn spammers, SEO wonks, and the lohita outfit to Pinboard. It does take action sometimes, but not at what I would call hopping bunny rabbit speed. The speed of disappearance is fascinating.
- The assertions are quite remarkable. They are presented without evidence. I do know that Palantir when it first first birthed in that fertile Silicon Valley spirit sold a project to a three letter agency. I do not know if Palantir enjoys insider status with the freedom to pump global data into a government system. Maybe, but perhaps this seems inflammatory, not informative.
Net net: This is an interesting use of social media. One tweet got me moving. If something interesting comes out of this demonstration of social media’s “value,” we will post it. For now. I just have questions. Oh, we love the right click wheel thing.
Stephen E Arnold, February 16, 2026
Govini? Another Palantir Technologies?
November 7, 2025
Good news. Another Palantir. Just what we need. CNBC reports, “Govini, a Defense Tech Startup Taking on Palantir, Hits $100 Million in Annual Recurring Revenue.” Writer Samantha Subin tells us:
“Govini, a defense tech software startup taking on the likes of Palantir, has blown past $100 million in annual recurring revenue, the company announced Friday. ‘We’re growing faster than 100% in a three-year CAGR, and I expect that next year we’ll continue to do the same,’ CEO Tara Murphy Dougherty told CNBC’s Morgan Brennan in an interview. With how ‘big this market is, we can keep growing for a long, long time, and that’s really exciting.’ CAGR stands for compound annual growth rate, a measurement of the rate of return. The Arlington, Virginia-based company also announced a $150 million growth investment from Bain Capital. It plans to use the money to expand its team and product offering to satisfy growing security demands.”
A former business-development leader at Palantir, Dougherty says her current firm is aiming for a “vertical slice” of the defense tech field. We learn:
“The 14-year-old Govini has already secured a string of big wins in recent years, including an over $900-million U.S. government contract and deals with the Department of War. Govini is known for its flagship AI software Ark, which it says can help modernize the military’s defense tech supply chain by better managing product lifecycles as military needs grow more sophisticated.”
The CEO asserts China’s dominance in rare earths and processed minerals and its faster shipbuilding capacity are reasons to worry. Sounds familiar. However, she believes an efficient and effective procurement system like Ark can provide an advantage for the US. Perhaps. But does it come with sides of secrecy, surveillance, and influence a la Palantir? Stay tuned.
Cynthia Murrell, November 7, 2025
First WAP? What Is That? Who Let the Cat Out of the Bag?
October 21, 2025
This essay is the work of a dumb dinobaby. No smart software required.
Ageing in rural Kentucky is not a good way to keep up with surveillance technology. I did spot a post on LinkedIn. I will provide a url for the LinkedIn post, but I have zero clue if anyone reading this blog will be able to view the information. The focus of the LinkedIn post is that some wizards have taken inspiration from NSO Group-type of firms and done some innovation. Like any surveillance technology, one has to apply it in a real life situation. Sometimes there is a slight difference between demonstrations, PowerPoint talks, and ease of use. But, hey, that’s the MBA-inspired way to riches or at least in NSO Group’s situation, infamy.
Letting the cat out of the bag. Who is the individual? The president, an executive, a conference organizer, or a stealthy “real” journalist. One thing is clear: The cat is out of the bag. Thanks, Venice.ai. Good enough.
The LinkedIn post is from an entity using the handle OSINT Industries. Here is the link, dutifully copied from Microsoft’s outstanding social media platform. Don’t blame me if it doesn’t work. Microsoft just blames users, so just look in the mirror and complain: https://www.linkedin.com/posts/osint-industries_your-phone-is-being-tracked-right-now-ugcPost-7384354091293982721-KQWk?utm_source=share&utm_medium=member_desktop&rcm=ACoAAAACYEwBhJbGkTw7Ad0vyN4RcYKj0Su8NUU
How’s that for a link. ShortURL spit out this version: https://shorturl.at/x2Qx9.
So what’s the big deal. Cyber security outfits and an online information service (in the old days a printed magazine) named Mother Jones learned that an outfit called First WAP exploited the SS7 telecom protocol. As i understand this signal switching, SS7 is about 50 years old and much loved by telephony nerds and Bell heads. The system and method acts like an old fashioned switchyard operator at a rail yard in the 1920s. Signals are filtered from voice channels. Call connections and other housekeeping are pushed to the SS7 digital switchyard. Instead of being located underground in Manhattan, the SS7 system is digital and operates globally. I have heard but have no first hand information about its security vulnerabilities. I know that a couple of companies are associated with switching fancy dancing. Do security exploits work? Well, the hoo-hah about First WAP suggests that SS7 exploitation is available.
The LinkedIn post says that “The scale [is] 14,000+ phone numbers. 160 countries. Over 1 million location pings.
A bit more color appears in the Russian information service ? FrankMedia.ru’s report “First WAP Empire: How Hidden Technology Followed Leaders and Activists.” The article is in Russian, but ever-reliable Google Translate makes short work of one’s language blind spots. Here are some interesting points from Frank Media:
- First WAP has been in business for about 17 or 18 years
- The system was used to track Google and Raytheon professionals
- First WAP relies on resellers of specialized systems and services and does not do too much direct selling. The idea is that the intermediaries are known to the government buyers. A bright engineer from another country is generally viewed as someone who should not be in a meeting with certain government professionals. This is nothing personal, you understand. This is just business.
- The system is named Altamides, which may be a variant of a Greek word for “powerful.”
The big reveal in the Russian write up is that a journalist got into the restricted conference, entered into a conversation with an attendee at the restricted conference, and got information which has put First WAP in the running to be the next NSO Group in terms of PR problems. The Frank Media write up does a fine job of identifying two individuals. One is the owner of the firm and the other is the voluble business development person.
Well, everyone gets 15 minutes of fame. Let me provide some additional, old-person information. First, the company’s Web address is www.1rstwap.com. Second, the firm’s alleged full name is First WAP International DMCC. The “DMCC” acronym means that the firm operates from Dubai’s economic zone. Third, the firm sells through intermediaries; for example, an outfit called KCS operating allegedly from the UK. Companies House information is what might be called sparse.
Several questions:
- How did a non-LE or intel professional get into the conference?
- Why was the company to operate off the radar for more than a decade?
- What benefits does First WAP derive from its nominal base in Indonesia?
- What are the specific security vulnerabilities First WAP exploits?
- Why do the named First WAP executives suddenly start talking after many years of avoiding an NSO-type PR problem?
Carelessness seems to be the reason this First WAP got its wireless access protocol put in the spotlight. Nice work!
To WAP up, you can download the First WAP encrypted messaging application from… wait for it… the Google Play Store. The Google listing includes this statement, “No data shared with third parties.” Think about that statement.
Stephen E Arnold, October 21, 2025
Microsoft Investigates Itself and a Customer: Finding? Nothing to See Here
May 26, 2025
No AI, just a dinobaby and his itty bitty computer.
GeekWire, creator of the occasional podcast, published “Microsoft: No Evidence Israeli Military Used Technology to Harm Civilians, Reviews Find.” When an outfit emits occasional podcasts published a story, I know that the information is 100 percent accurate. GeekWire has written about Microsoft and its outstanding software. Like Windows Central, the enthusiasm for what the Softies do is a key feature of the information.
What did I learn included:
- Israel’s military uses Microsoft technology
- Israel may have used Microsoft technology to harm non-civilians
- The study was conducted by the detail-oriented and consistently objective company. Self-study is known to be reliable, a bit like research papers from Harvard which are a bit dicey in the reproducible results department
- The data available for the self-study was limited; that is, Microsoft relied on an incomplete data set because certain information was presumably classified
- Microsoft “provided limited emergency support to the Israeli government following the October 7, 2023, Hamas attacks.”
Yeah, that sounds rock solid to me.
Why did the creator of Bob and Clippy sit down and study its navel? The write up reported:
Microsoft said it launched the reviews in response to concerns from employees and the public over media reports alleging that its Azure cloud platform and AI technologies were being used by the Israeli military to harm civilians.
The Microsoft investigation concluded:
its recent reviews found no evidence that the Israeli Ministry of Defense has failed to comply with its terms of service or AI Code of Conduct.
That’s a fact. More than rock solid, the fact is like one of those pre-Inca megaliths. That’s really solid.
GeekWire goes out on a limb in my opinion when it includes in the write up a statement from an individual who does not see eye to eye with the Softies’ investigation. Here’s that passage:
A former Microsoft employee who was fired after protesting the company’s ties to the Israeli military, he said the company’s statement is “filled with both lies and contradictions.”
What’s with the allegation of “lies and contradictions”? Get with the facts. Skip the bogus alternative facts.
I do recall that several years ago I was told by an Israeli intelware company that their service was built on Microsoft technology. Now here’s the key point. I asked if the cloud system worked on Amazon? The response was total confusion. In that English language meeting, I wondered if I had suffered a neural malfunction and posed the question, “Votre système fonctionne-t-il sur le service cloud d’Amazon?” in French, not English.
The idea that this firm’s state-of-the-art intelware would be anything other than Microsoft centric was a total surprise to those in the meeting. It seemed to me that this company’s intelware like others developed in Israel would be non Microsoft was inconceivable.
Obviously these professionals were not aware that intelware systems (some of which failed to detect threats prior to the October 2023 attack) would be modified so that only adversary military personnel would be harmed. That’s what the Microsoft investigation just proved.
Based on my experience, Israel’s military innovations are robust despite that October 2023 misstep. Furthermore, warfighting systems if they do run on Microsoft software and systems have the ability to discriminate between combatants and non-combatants. This is an important technical capability and almost on a par with the Bob interface, Clippy, and AI in Notepad.
I don’t know about you, but the Microsoft investigation put my mind at ease.
Stephen E Arnold, May 26, 2025
Sharp Words about US Government Security
May 22, 2025
No AI. Just a dinobaby who gets revved up with buzzwords and baloney.
On Monday (April 29, 2025), I am headed to the US National Cyber Crime Conference. I am 80, and I don’t do too many “in person” lectures. Heck, I don’t do too many lectures anymore period. A candidate for the rest home or an individual ready for a warehouse for the soon-to-die is a unicorn amidst the 25 to 50 year old cyber fraud, law enforcement professionals, and government investigators.
In my lectures, I steer clear of political topics. This year, I have been assigned a couple of topics which the NCCC organizers know attract a couple of people out of the thousand or so attendees. One topic concerns changes in the Dark Web. Since I wrote “Dark Web Notebook” years ago, my team and I keep track of what’s new and interesting in the world of the Dark Web. This year, I will highlight three or four services which caught our attention. The other topic is my current research project: Telegram. I am not sure how I became interested in this messaging service, but my team and I will will make available to law enforcement, crime analysts, and cyber fraud investigators a monograph modeled on the format we used for the “Dark Web Notebook.”
I am in a security mindset before the conference. I am on the lookout for useful information which I can use as a point of reference or as background information. Despite my age, I want to appear semi competent. Thus, I read “Signalgate Lessons Learned: If Creating a Culture of Security Is the Goal, America Is Screwed.” I think the source publication is British. The author may be an American journalist.
Several points in the write up caught my attention.
First, the write up makes a statement I found interesting:
And even if they are using Signal, which is considered the gold-standard for end-to-end chat encryption, there’s no guarantee their personal devices haven’t been compromised with some sort of super-spyware like Pegasus, which would allow attackers to read the messages once they land on their phones.
I did not know that Signal was “considered the gold standard for end-to-end chat encryption.” I wonder if there are some data to back this up.
Second, is NSO Group’s Pegasus “super spyware.” My information suggests that there are more modern methods. Some link to Israel but others connect to other countries; for example, Spain, the former Czech Republic, and others. I am not sure what “super” means, and the write up does not offer much other than a nebulous adjectival “super spyware.”
Third, these two references are fascinating:
“The Salt Typhoon and Volt Typhoon campaigns out of China demonstrate this ongoing threat to our telecom systems. Circumventing the Pentagon’s security protocol puts sensitive intelligence in jeopardy.”
The authority making the statement is a former US government official who went on to found a cyber security company. There were publicized breaches, and I am not sure comparable to Pegasus type of data exfiltration method. “Insider threats” are different from lousy software from established companies with vulnerabilities as varied as Joseph’s multi-colored coat. An insider, of course, is an individual presumed to be “trusted”; however, that entity provides information for money to an individual who wants to compromise a system, a person who makes an error (honest or otherwise), and victims who fall victim to quite sophisticated malware specifically designed to allow targeted emails designed to obtain information to compromise that person or a system. In fact, the most sophisticated of these “phishing” attack systems are available for about $250 per month for the basic version with higher fees associated with more robust crime as a service vectors of compromise.
The opinion piece seems to focus on a single issue focused on one of the US government’s units. I am okay with that; however, I think a slightly different angle would put the problem and challenge of “security” in a context less focused on ad hominin rhetorical methods.
Stephen E Arnold, May 22, 2025
Microsoft: What Is a Brand Name?
May 20, 2025
Just the dinobaby operating without Copilot or its ilk.
I know that Palantir Technologies, a firm founded in 2003, used the moniker “Foundry” to describe its platform for government use. My understanding is that Palantir Foundry was a complement to Palantir Gotham. How different were these “platforms”? My recollection is that Palantir used home-brew software and open source to provide the raw materials from which the company shaped its different marketing packages. I view Palantir as a consulting services company with software, including artificial intelligence. The idea is that Palantir can now perform like Harris’ Analyst Notebook as well as deliver semi-custom, industrial-strength solutions to provide unified solutions to thorny information challenges. I like to think of Palantir’s present product and service line up as a Distributed Common Ground Information Service that generally works. About a year ago, Microsoft and Palantir teamed up to market Microsoft – Palantir solutions to governments via “bootcamps.” These are training combined with “here’s what you too can deploy” programs designed to teach and sell the dream of on-time, on-target information for a range of government applications.
I read “Microsoft Is Now Hosting xAI’s Grok 3 Models” and noted this subtitle:
Grok 3 and Grok 3 mini are both coming to Microsoft’s Azure AI Foundry service.
Microsoft’s Foundry service. Is that Palantir’s Foundry, a mash up of Microsoft and Palantir, or something else entirely. The name confuses me, and I wonder if government procurement professionals will be knocked off center as well. The “dream” of smart software is a way to close deals in some countries’ government agencies. However, keeping the branding straight is also important.
What does one call a Foundry with a Grok? Shakespeare suggested that it would smell as sweet no matter what the system was named. Thanks, OpenAI? Good enough.
The write up says:
At Microsoft’s Build developer conference today, the company confirmed it’s expanding its Azure AI Foundry models list to include Grok 3 and Grok 3 mini from xAI.
It is not clear if Microsoft will offer Grok as another large language model or whether [a] Palantir will be able to integrate Grok into its Foundry product, [b] Microsoft Foundry is Microsoft’s own spin on Palantir’s service which is deprecated to some degree, or [c] a way to give Palantir direct, immediate access to the Grok smart software. There are other possibilities as well; for example, Foundry is a snappy name in some government circles. Use what helps close deals with end-of-year money or rev up for new funds seeking smart software.
The write up points out that Sam AI-Man may be annoyed with the addition of Grok to the Microsoft toolkit. Both OpenAI and Grok have some history. Maybe Microsoft is positioning itself as the role of the great mediator, a digital Henry Clay of sorts?
A handful of companies are significant influencers of smart software in some countries’ Microsoft-centric approach to platform technology. Microsoft’s software and systems are so prevalent that Israel did some verbal gymnastics to make clear that Microsoft technology was not used in the Gaza conflict. This is an assertion that I find somewhat difficult to accept.
What is going on with large language models at Microsoft? My take is:
- Microsoft wants to offer a store shelf stocked with LLMs so that consulting service revenue provides evergreen subscription revenue
- Customers who want something different, hot, or new can make a mark on the procurement shopping list and Microsoft will do its version of home delivery, not quite same day but convenient
- Users are not likely to know what smart software is fixing up their Miltonic prose or centering a graphic on a PowerPoint slide.
What about the brand or product name “Foundry”? Answer: Use what helps close deals perhaps? Does Palantir get a payoff? Yep.
Stephen E Arnold, May 20, 2025
NSO Group: When Marketing and Confidence Mix with Specialized Software
May 13, 2025
No AI, just the dinobaby expressing his opinions to Zellenials.
Some specialized software must remain known only to a small number of professionals specifically involved in work related to national security. This is a dinobaby view, and I am not going to be swayed with “information wants to be free” arguments or assertions about the need to generate revenue to make the investors “whole.” Abandoning secrecy and common sense for glittering generalities and MBA mumbo jumbo is ill advised.
I read “Meta Wins $168 Million in Damages from Israeli Cyberintel Firm in Whatsapp Spyware Scandal.” The write up reports:
Meta won nearly $168 million in damages Tuesday from Israeli cyberintelligence company NSO Group, capping more than five years of litigation over a May 2019 attack that downloaded spyware on more than 1,400 WhatsApp users’ phones.
The decision is likely to be appealed, so the “won” is not accurate. What is interesting is this paragraph:
[Yaron] Shohat [NSO’s CEO] declined an interview outside the Ron V. Dellums Federal Courthouse, where the court proceedings were held.
From my point of view, fewer trade shows, less marketing, and a lower profile should be action items for Mr. Shohat, the NSO Group’s founders, and the firm’s lobbyists.
I watched as NSO Group became the poster child for specialized software. I was not happy as the firm’s systems and methods found their way into publicly accessible Web sites. I reacted negatively as other specialized software firms (these I will not identify) began describing their technology as similar to NSO Group’s.
The desperation of cyber intelligence, specialized software firms, and — yes — trade show operators is behind the crazed idea of making certain information widely available. I worked in the nuclear industry in the early 1970s. From Day One on the job, the message was, “Don’t talk.” I then shifted to a blue chip consulting firm working on a wide range of projects. From Day One on that job, the message was, “Don’t talk.” When I set up my own specialized research firm, the message I conveyed to my team members was, “Don’t talk.”
Then it seemed that everyone wanted to “talk”. Marketing, speeches, brochures, even YouTube videos distributed information that was never intended to be made widely available. Without operating context and quite specific knowledge, jazzy pitches that used terms like “zero day vulnerability” and other crazy sales oriented marketing lingo made specialized software something many people without operating context and quite specific knowledge “experts.”
I see this leakage of specialized software information in the OSINT blurbs on LinkedIn. I see it in social media posts by people with weird online handles like those used in Top Gun films. I see it when I go to a general purpose knowledge management meeting.
Now the specialized software industry is visible. In my opinion, that is not a good thing. I hope Mr. Shohat and others in the specialized software field continue the “decline to comment” approach. Knock off the PR. Focus on the entities authorized to use specialized software. The field is not for computer whiz kids, eGame players, and wanna be intelligence officers.
Do your job. Don’t talk. Do I think these marketing oriented 21st century specialized software companies will change their behavior? Answer: Oh, sure.
PS. I hope the backstory for Facebook / Meta’s interest in specialized software becomes part of a public court record. I am curious is what I have learned matches up to the court statements. My hunch is that some social media executives have selective memories. That’s a useful skill I have heard.
Stephen E Arnold, May 13, 2025
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