Cyber Security: Do the Children of Shoemakers Have Yeezies or Sandals?
November 7, 2025
Another short essay from a real and still-alive dinobaby. If you see an image, we used AI. The dinobaby is not an artist like Grandma Moses.
When I attended conferences, I liked to stop at the exhibitor booths and listen to the sales pitches. I remember one event held in a truly shabby hotel in Tyson’s Corner. The vendor whose name escapes me explained that his firm’s technology could monitor employee actions, flag suspicious behaviors, and virtually eliminate insider threats. I stopped at the booth the next day and asked, “How can your monitoring technology identify individuals who might flip the color of their hat from white to black?” The answer was, “Patterns.” I found the response interesting because virtually every cyber security firm with whom I have interacted over the years talks about patterns.

Thanks, OpenAI. Good enough.
The problem is that individuals aware of what are mostly brute-force methods of identifying that employee A tried to access a Dark Web site known for selling malware works if the bad actor is clueless. But what happens if the bad actors were actually wearing white hats, riding white stallions, and saying, “Hi ho, Silver, away”?
Here’s the answer: “Prosecutors allege incident response pros used ALPHV/BlackCat to commit string of ransomware attacks
.” The write up explains that “cybersecurity turncoats attacked at least five US companies while working for” cyber security firms. Here’s an interesting passage from the write up:
Ryan Clifford Goldberg, Kevin Tyler Martin and an unnamed co–conspirator — all U.S. nationals — began using ALPHV, also known as BlackCat, ransomware to attack companies in May 2023, according to indictments and other court documents in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida. At the time of the attacks, Goldberg was a manager of incident response at Sygnia, while Martin, a ransomware negotiator at DigitalMint, allegedly collaborated with Goldberg and another co-conspirator, who also worked at DigitalMint and allegedly obtained an affiliate account on ALPHV. The trio are accused of carrying out the conspiracy from May 2023 through April 2025, according to an affidavit.
How long did the malware attacks persist? Just from May 2023 until April 2025.
Obviously the purpose of the bad behavior was money. But the key point is that, according to the article, “he was recruited by the unnamed co-conspirator.”
And that, gentle reader, is how bad actors operate. Money pressure, some social engineering probably at a cyber security conference, and a pooling of expertise. I am not sure that insider threat software can identify this type of behavior. The evidence is that multiple cyber security firms employed these alleged bad actors and the scam was afoot for more that 20 months. And what about the people who hired these individuals? That screening seems to be somewhat spotty, doesn’t it?
Several observations:
- Cyber security firms themselves are not able to operate in a secure manner
- Trust in Fancy Dan software may be misplaced. Managers and co-workers need to be alert and have a way to communicate suspicions in an appropriate way
- The vendors of insider threat detection software may want to provide some hard proof that their systems operate when hats change from black to white.
Everyone talks about the boom in smart software. But cyber security is undergoing a similar economic gold rush. This example, if it is indeed accurate, indicates that companies may develop, license, and use cyber security software. Does it work? I suggest you ask the “leadership” of the firms involved in this legal matter.
Stephen E Arnold, November 7, 2025
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