Scattered Spider: Operating Freely Despite OSINT and Specialized Investigative Tools. Why?

July 7, 2025

Dino 5 18 25No smart software to write this essay. This dinobaby is somewhat old fashioned.

I don’t want to create a dust up in the specialized software sector. I noted the July 2, 2025, article “A Group of Young Cybercriminals Poses the Most Imminent Threat of Cyberattacks Right Now.” That story surprised me. First, the Scattered Spider group was documented (more or less) by Trellix, a specialized software and services firm. You can read the article “Scattered Spider: The Modus Operandi” and get a sense of what Trellix reported. The outfit even has a Wikipedia article about their activities.

Last week I was asked a direct question, “Which of the specialized services firms can provide me with specific information about Telegram Groups and Channels, both public and private?” My answer, “None yet.”

Scattered Spider uses Telegram for some messaging functions, and if you want to get a sense of what the outfit does, just fire up your OSINT tools or better yet use one of the very expensive specialized services available to government agencies. The young cybercriminals appear to use the alias @ScatteredSpiderERC.” There is a Wikipedia article about this group’s activities.

So what? Let’s go back to the question addressed directly to me about firms that have content about Telegram. If we assume the Wikipedia write up is sort of correct, the Scattered Spider entity popped up in 2022 and its activities caught the attention of Trellix. The time between the Trellix post and the Wired story is about two years.

Why has a specialized services firm providing actionable data to the US government, the Europol investigators, and the dozens of others law enforcement operations around the world? Isn’t it a responsible act to use that access to Telegram data to take down outfits that endanger casinos and other organizations?

Apparently the answer is, “No.”

My hunch is that these specialized software firms talk about having tools to access Telegram. That talk is a heck of a lot easier than finding a reliable way to access private Groups and Channels, trace a handle back to a real live human being possibly operating in the EU or the US. I would suggest that France tried to use OSINT and the often nine figure systems to crack Telegram. Will other law enforcement groups realize that the specialized software vendors’ tools fall short of the mark and think about a France-type of response?

France seems to have made a dent in Telegram. I would hypothesize that the failure of OSINT and the specialized software tool vendors contributed to France’s decision to just arrest Pavel Durov. Mr. Durov is now ensnared in France’s judicial bureaucracy. To make the arrest more complex for Mr. Durov, he is a citizen of France and a handful of other countries, including Russia and the United Arab Emirates.

I mention this lack of Telegram cracking capability for three reasons:

  1. Telegram is in decline and the company is showing some signs of strain
  2. The changing attitude toward crypto in the US means that Telegram absolutely has to play in that market or face either erosion or decimation of its seven year push to create alternative financial services based on TONcoin and Pavel Durov’s partners’ systems
  3. Telegram is facing a new generation of messaging competitors. Like Apple, Telegram is late to the AI party.

One would think that at a critical point like this, the Shadow Server account would be a slam dunk for any licensee of specialized software advertising, “Telegram content.”

Where are those vendors who webinars, email blasts, and trade show demonstrations? Where are the testimonials that Company Nuco’s specialized software really did work. “Here’s what we used in court because the specialized vendor’s software generated this data for us” is what I want to hear. I would suggest that Telegram remains a bit of a challenge to specialized software vendors. Will I identify these “big hat, no cattle outfits”? Nope.

Just thought that a reminder that marketing and saying what government professionals want to hear are easier than just talking.

Stephen E Arnold, July 2025

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